Saturday, December 21, 2019

The Notion of Nothingness—Part 4: Some Additional Responses (12/21/19)


The responses I will describe in this post to the question Why is there something, rather than nothing? delve a little deeper into the issue, in the context of the previous posting's consideration of the definition of nothing. Now that we're potentially on the same page, we might better critically analyze some of these replies. I will attempt to present them from a common perspective.

These responses may also be thought of as the kind of answer or conclusion that a philosopher or scientist may settle upon, after listening to the earlier, immediate reactions... after further pondering the various alternative explanations offered by others.

One argument in this area of questioning of why anything exists—rather than a simpler nothing—is that the question actually rests upon certain hidden presuppositions. For example, our question presupposes that there must be an explanation, and even that we need an explanation. Why are we concerned at all about why the world exists? Why do we posit nothingness as the opposite of existence… the opposite of somethingness?

Furthermore, the question presupposes that nothingness even could exist. But how do we know that? We saw in the previous posting that it's hard to define nothingness, let alone demonstrate that it exists. This response also presupposes that nothingness could be the natural state of affairs of the cosmos. Why would anyone think that? There are those who argue that the existence of the universe is very much to be expected. Why would a nothingness state even be considered? In fact, there are some physicists who claim that the laws of Nature—which we humans been relentlessly discovering the last few centuries (but have yet much further to go)—might dictate that there has to be something. Nothing may simply not be allowed!

One appealing theory of some cosmologists is the possibility that the universe we know may be only one of countless others. Some mathematical derivations in quantum mechanics seem to suggest that a “multiverse” exists. String theory also leans in this direction—despite the fact that, to date, we have no evidence to support the reality of jillions of other universes… they just are a byproduct of the equations. If they do exist (maybe we'll find out some day), the answer to our question of why there is something rather than nothing becomes even more baffling and difficult, because if we are struggling to explain the existence of the one universe we know, isn't the problem ever so much harder, when we consider all those jillions of additional universes? Why do they exist?

Some scholars argue that the task is not to try to explain why the cosmos exists, but, more fundamentally, to describe what we mean by matter—that solid “something” that we're convinced is real. Here's another definition conundrum, it seems. Over 150 years ago the English practical physicist Michael Faraday argued that the only reason we have to suppose that matter truly exists, is because we can detect and measure the forces acting on it. If he’s right, we're compelled to describe reality by describing the forces and reactions on material things—not the things themselves. So what does this tell us about defining or detecting nothingness? Can nothing act on nothing? Isn't this getting overly complicated? My head is hurting.

Finally, some philosophers answer our question by saying it's not an either/or question of something or nothing... it's both. Is that a case of having your cake and also wanting to eat it? Doesn’t it maybe just raise another question: How can we have something in the presence of nothing? Yikes!

Will we have an answer some day, as science progresses? Maybe, maybe not. It may simply remain beyond us, kind of like the true nature of a television to a dog.

Next time (the last entry) we'll look at the question from a personal perspective...

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